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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first major empirical challenge to racial discrimination in the use 
of the death penalty in the United States was presented in federal court in 
the case of William L. Maxwell, who was sentenced to death in Arkansas in 
1962 for the crime of rape.1 It was based on a landmark study by Marvin 
Wolfgang, a distinguished criminologist who had collected data on some 
3000 rape convictions from 1945 through 1965 in selected counties across 
eleven southern states.2 He found that black men who were convicted of 
rape were seven times more likely to be sentenced to death than white men, 
and that black men who were convicted of raping white women were 
eighteen times more likely to be sentenced to death than men convicted of 
rape in any other racial combination.3 Wolfgang also examined other 
variables and found that the only one that was strongly related to death 
sentencing—the commission of a contemporaneous felony—did not explain 
these racial patterns.4 
In 1968, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge (later Justice) Harry 
Blackmun, rejected the Wolfgang study on three grounds.5 First, the court 
held that the data were not specific enough: too few cases came from the county 
in which Maxwell was prosecuted or even from Arkansas at all.6 Second, the 
data were not sufficiently detailed: “They admittedly do not take every variable 
into account.”7 Third, the study does not show intentional discrimination in 
Maxwell’s case: “They do not show that the petit jury which tried and 
convicted Maxwell acted in his case with racial discrimination.”8 Blackmun 
added: 
 We can understand and appreciate the disappointment and 
seeming frustration which Maxwell’s counsel must feel in again 
failing to prevail on a still more sophisticated statistical approach. 
They will ask themselves just how far they are required to go in 
order to prevail. 
 We are not certain that, for Maxwell, statistics will ever be his 
redemption. The facts as to rape charges in Garland County are 
known and have been recited. Standing by themselves, they 
 
 1. Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966), aff’d, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 
1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
 2. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 127 (1973). 
 3. Id. at 129–30. 
 4. Id. at 132. 
 5. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
 6. Id. at 146 
 7. Id. at 147 
 8. Id. 
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disclose nothing from which conclusions of unconstitutionality in 
application may appropriately be drawn.9 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Maxwell and reversed on an unrelated issue without 
mentioning race.10 
Nineteen years later, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court rejected 
another challenge to racial discrimination in the use of the death penalty.11 
This time the state was Georgia and the challenge was based on a study by 
David Baldus. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, echoed some of 
Blackmun’s sentiments in Maxwell: 
[McCleskey] offers no evidence specific to his own case that would 
support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his 
sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the Baldus study. McCleskey 
argues that the Baldus study compels an inference that his sentence 
rests on purposeful discrimination. 
. . . . 
[W]e hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an 
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted 
with discriminatory purpose.12 
At first glance, it looks like nothing changed from 1968 to 1987. 
Indeed, since the Court has not revisited the issue since McCleskey, one could 
conclude that nothing changed from 1968 through the present. That would 
be a mistake. McCleskey was a turning point in the constitutional regulation 
of the death penalty in the United States, and it has influenced our 
collective view of race in the criminal-justice system generally. Its full impact 
is not yet known. The person most responsible for the decision in McCleskey 
was David Baldus. 
In this Essay, I will briefly review the history and the enduring 
importance of the McCleskey case, and the work by David Baldus and his 
colleagues on which it was based. 
II. THE CONTEXT: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REGULATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Racial discrimination has been the single most troubling issue for the 
death penalty in the United States in the past fifty years. It never goes away. 
In 1965, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (“Legal 
Defense Fund”), the law office that litigated Brown v. Board of Education13 and 
 
 9. Id. at 148. 
 10. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
 11. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 12. Id. at 292–93, 297 (footnote omitted). 
 13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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many other civil rights cases, embarked on a systematic program of litigation 
in opposition to the death penalty. That decision led to the modern era of 
constitutional regulation of capital punishment. The Legal Defense Fund’s 
goal was, and remains, abolition of capital punishment for all defendants 
and for all crimes, but the reason that the civil rights organization took up 
the issue was their deep experience with racial discrimination in the use of 
the death penalty in the South. The Legal Defense Fund campaign against 
the death penalty produced Marvin Wolfgang’s landmark study and the 
unsuccessful litigation in Maxwell.14 
In 1972, the Legal Defense Fund campaign against capital punishment 
culminated in Furman v. Georgia, in which a hopelessly fractured Supreme 
Court held that all then-existing death penalty statutes in the United States 
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.15 Furman is something of a Rorschach test. The five Justices in 
the majority wrote five separate one-Justice opinions. Furman is understood 
to prohibit the “arbitrary” imposition of the death penalty. That is a rough 
description of the positions of Justices Stewart and White, the two Justices 
who joined the majority on the narrowest grounds.16 More important, that is 
how Furman is described in later opinions of the Court.17 
In an alternate universe, Furman might have marked the end of capital 
punishment in the United States. But the Court did not say that death is an 
inherently cruel and unusual punishment, and dozens of states responded 
to Furman by enacting new death-sentencing laws that attempted to remedy 
the problem of “arbitrariness.” In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court held 
that several of those new statutes were at least potentially constitutional—
those that, like Georgia’s new death-penalty law, provided for “guided 
discretion” to juries and judges in imposing death sentences and therefore, 
presumably, reduced or eliminated the “arbitrariness” that was condemned 
in Furman.18 
Since Gregg, racial discrimination in the use of the death penalty has 
been understood to be unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment as well as the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Three of the Justices in 
the Furman majority discussed discrimination in capital sentencing,19 and at 
 
 14. See generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973). 
 15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 16. Id. at 306–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring). 
 17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 18. See id. at 188–95; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976). 
 19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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least two of them seemed to rely on it in reaching their separate 
judgments.20 In any event, the received wisdom after 1976 was that racial 
discrimination is an element of the “arbitrariness” that “was condemned in 
Furman” and one of the evils that the post-Furman capital-sentencing reforms 
were designed to cure.21 
In the wake of Gregg, the Supreme Court has been mired in an endless, 
contentious, and sometimes bizarre program of constitutional regulation of 
the death penalty.22 I will not begin to discuss that huge and confusing topic, 
except to note that in general it addresses procedure: What rules are 
permitted or required for a constitutional death penalty? That gives the 
Court a great deal of freedom. When the question is, for example, the 
constitutionality of executing defendants for crimes committed before they 
reached eighteen years of age,23 the Court can both define the issues and set 
the rules. 
Race discrimination is different. No one doubts that racial 
discrimination by the state is unconstitutional, in this and in almost every 
other context. The question is actual practice: Did the state in fact 
discriminate by race in imposing and executing death sentences? It is 
concrete and potentially incendiary. Courts can define and redefine the 
term “discrimination” to produce the outcome they want, but they have to 
deal with facts on the ground, which can be ugly. 
The Supreme Court has almost never found systemic racial 
discrimination in the administration of criminal justice by the states. In 
1996, in United States v. Armstrong, the Court claimed that its requirements 
for proof of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause “[do] 
not make a selective-prosecution claim impossible to prove”24—but the only 
successful claim it could cite was in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,25 which had been 
decided in 1886, 110 years earlier. In most cases, the Court simply ducks the 
issue. That’s what the Court did in Maxwell in 1968. In 1977, one year after 
Gregg, it did it again. In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the 
death penalty is unconstitutional for the crime of rape.26 The Court, of 
course, was well aware of the notorious racist history of capital punishment 
for rape. The Wolfgang study was presented to it in Maxwell v. Bishop27 and 
 
 20. See id. at 255–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 21. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 890–91 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 
279 (1987); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 613–14 & n.38 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 22. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995); Robert 
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305 (1983). 
 23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 24. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 466 (1996). 
 25. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). 
 26. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 27. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
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was discussed in briefs in later cases, including Furman and Gregg. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion in Coker makes no mention of race. If you 
didn’t know better, you could read it and never realize that there is more 
than one race in the United States. 
III. THE MCCLESKEY LITIGATION 
A. PRE-MCCLESKEY CASES 
After Gregg, it was only a matter of time before the question of racial 
discrimination in the use of the death penalty would surface again. The 
earliest challenges were based on research that could be done relatively 
quickly and inexpensively. In particular, a 1980 study by William Bowers and 
Glenn Pierce compared reported homicides and death sentences in Florida, 
Georgia, Texas, and Ohio.28 In each state they found that courts were more 
likely to impose death sentences for homicides with white victims than for 
those with black victims and that black defendants charged with killing white 
victims were more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants 
charged with killing white victims.29 
The lower federal courts rejected these challenges by the simplest 
means available. In 1981, for example, in Smith v. Balkcom, the Fifth Circuit 
held that because the Bowers and Pierce study left “untouched countless 
racially neutral variables”30—variables that describe the charging of reported 
homicides, the disposition of those charges at trial, and the presence of 
aggravating and mitigating factors that bear on the choice of punishment—
it could be ignored, without a hearing to explore its validity and 
significance.31 
By 1982, David Baldus and his colleagues had completed the first of 
their two major studies of death sentencing in Georgia, the Procedural Reform 
Study,32 and three prisoners on Georgia’s death row offered it in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding in support of their joint claim of discrimination 
in capital sentencing. In a supplemental opinion issued in light of Baldus’s 
study, the district court, tracking the circuit court’s language in Smith but 
 
 28. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman 
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 594 tbl.2. 
 30. Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 31. Id. at 860; see also Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 616 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(rejecting an equal protection challenge because evidence put forth “could not prove 
discriminatory intent or purpose”). 
 32. For a discussion of this study, see McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353–55 (N.D. 
Ga. 1984), rev’d in part, aff’d in part sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), 
aff’d, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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ignoring the record before it, dismissed the claim because Baldus’s study 
“leaves untouched countless racially neutral variables.”33 
That was a mistake. The hallmark of David Baldus’s work was his 
commitment to leave no case and no variable untouched. When Spencer v. 
Zant, the first of the three cases reached the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, it 
was reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing: “Dr. Baldus’s study 
[may have] addressed the very defects identified in the evidence in . . . 
Smith . . . . The merits of this allegation cannot be assessed without a more 
detailed consideration of the evidence proffered by the petitioners below.”34 
B. MCCLESKEY IN THE LOWER COURTS 
By the time Spencer was decided on appeal in September 1983, both 
Baldus studies—the more comprehensive Charging and Sentencing Study as 
well as the Procedural Reform Study—had been completed and presented in 
another case. Warren McCleskey, a black man, was sentenced to death in 
Fulton County, Georgia, in 1978 for killing a white police officer. In late 
1981, Legal Defense Fund lawyers representing McCleskey filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia, claiming, among other issues, that his death 
sentence was the product of racial discrimination, as shown by the Baldus 
research. In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit stayed rehearing proceedings in 
Spencer pending the outcome of the same claim in McCleskey’s case,35 which 
had become the designated vehicle for consideration of the Baldus studies 
in the federal courts. 
Before David Baldus, studies of racial discrimination in the use of the 
death penalty were difficult but manageable undertakings. Some studies 
used data that had been compiled by government agencies, especially the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.36 Others—even Marvin Wolfgang’s impressive 
path-breaking work—sampled comparatively small numbers of cases and 
considered limited numbers of non-racial variables that might explain any 
racial disparities. The research conducted by Baldus and his colleagues was 
different in kind. The basic posture—which Dave Baldus personified—was 
simple: “Why not find out everything about every case?” 
For most of us, that is not a rhetorical question. The unfortunate 
answer is that we have limited time, money, and energy. Baldus was subject 
to two of those limits—time and money—but did more with what he had 
than seems humanly possible. There is no empirical evidence that he ever 
 
 33. Ross v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (quoting Balkcom, 671 F.2d at 
859), modifying Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in 
part en banc sub nom. Ross v. Kemp, 756 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 34. Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1582 (11th Cir. 1983), reh’g granted en banc sub nom. 
Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 35. Spencer v. Zant, 729 F.2d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 36. E.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 28, at 591. 
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lacked energy. The Georgia studies that were the subject of the McCleskey 
litigation are prime examples of his style of work. 
For the Procedural Reform Study, David Baldus and his colleagues, Charles 
Pulaski and George Woodworth, compiled data on over 200 variables for 
594 defendants who were tried and sentenced for murder in Georgia from 
March 1973 through July 1978.37 This was an uncommonly comprehensive 
sentencing study, but it had limitations. It lacked data on the strength of the 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and, since it was restricted to murder 
convictions, it did not examine the possibility of pretrial discrimination in 
charging and plea bargaining. These gaps were filled by the Charging and 
Sentencing Study, which covered 1066 Georgia homicide prosecutions from 
1973 through 1980, manslaughter convictions and guilty pleas as well as 
murder convictions, and included detailed data on an expanded list of over 
400 nonracial variables.38 The court opinions in McCleskey focus on the more 
comprehensive Charging and Sentencing Study. (In fact, they uniformly refer 
to the Baldus “study” despite the fact that both Baldus studies are in the 
record. I will follow suit and refer to the Baldus research in the McCleskey 
record as a single study.) 
I will not try to summarize the findings of the Baldus study. A small 
library has been published on the topic, including a book by Baldus himself 
with George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski.39 Suffice it to say that Baldus 
and his colleagues found a strong and consistent pattern of discrimination 
in the use of the death penalty against defendants who were charged with 
killing white victims compared to those who were charged with killing black 
victims. They also found a weaker pattern of discrimination against black 
defendants (for example, Warren McCleskey himself) in homicide cases in 
which the victim was white. Finally, the study had a sufficient number of 
cases and sufficiently detailed data to show that these patterns applied to 
homicides in Fulton County, where McCleskey was convicted and sentenced 
to death, as well as in Georgia as a whole. 
Like other courts that faced this issue, the district court rejected 
McCleskey’s claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing on 
empirical grounds.40 Given the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Spencer, 
however, the judge was unable to do so on the preferred basis: failure to 
examine a sufficient number of nonracial variables. Instead, he attacked the 
Baldus study on several other fronts: (1) the database was too inaccurate to 
 
 37. See McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 353–55. 
 38. See id. 
 39. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
 40. McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 346–80. The district court did grant an unrelated claim by 
McCleskey and ordered a new trial. Id. at 384. That order was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit 
on appeal. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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form a basis for useful conclusions;41 (2) the statistical models used by 
Baldus and his colleagues were flawed;42 (3) the data did not demonstrate 
that the capital-sentencing system in Georgia was discriminatory;43 and 
(4) the statistical methodology used had no value in this context.44 In short, 
the judge concluded that the Baldus study “fail[ed] to contribute anything of 
value” to McCleskey’s claim.45 
The district court’s opinion in McCleskey includes thirty-five pages on the 
claim of racial discrimination.46 Its discussion of the Baldus study and of 
statistics is detailed and self-assured—and probably pretty convincing, unless 
you happen to know something about the record in the case or about 
statistics. In fact, most of the criticisms of Professor Baldus’s research are 
unfair and inaccurate, and many of the statements about statistics are simply 
false, as I have discussed at length elsewhere.47 But there is little reason to 
pay attention to the district court opinion. Its rationale and conclusions were 
all but ignored by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal and by the Supreme Court 
in its review of the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit opinion in McCleskey notes that “[t]he district 
court held the [Baldus] study to be invalid,”48 but the circuit court itself 
takes a different tack. 
 We assume without deciding that the Baldus study is sufficient to 
show . . . . that systematic and substantial disparities existed in the 
penalties imposed upon homicide defendants in Georgia based on 
race of the homicide victim, that the disparities existed at a less 
substantial rate in death sentencing based on race of defendants, 
and that the factors of race of the victim and defendant were at 
work in Fulton County.49 
The court “pretermit[s] a review of . . . the validity of the study itself” 
because “even if the statistical results are accepted as valid, the evidence fails 
to challenge successfully the constitutionality of the Georgia system.”50 
The problem for the circuit court is the magnitude of the racial 
discrimination found by the study. The court holds that no hearing or 
factual assessment is required for a statistical study of discrimination in 
capital sentencing, regardless of its quality, unless it “reflect[s] a [racial] 
 
 41. McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 354–60. 
 42. Id. at 360–64. 
 43. Id. at 364–69, 372–77. 
 44. Id. at 369–72. 
 45. Id. at 372. 
 46. Id. at 346–80. 
 47. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 153 nn.20 & 21 (1989). 
 48. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 894 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 895. 
 50. Id. at 894–95. 
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disparity so great as to inevitably lead to a conclusion that the disparity results 
from intent or motivation.”51 The Baldus study fails that test. “The result of 
Baldus’ [sic] most conclusive model, on which McCleskey primarily relies, 
showed an effect of 0.06, signifying that on average a white victim crime is 
6% more likely to result in the [death] sentence than a comparable black 
victim crime.”52 This “6% bottom line” is “not sufficient to overcome the 
presumption that the statute is operating in a constitutional manner.”53 
The circuit court holding in McCleskey is hard to fathom. “Six percent” 
may not seem like a lot in some contexts—say the difference between male 
and female employment at a plant with 53% men and 47% women. On the 
other hand, as I write in 2012, 6% interest on a savings account would be 
astronomically high, and a 6% annual growth rate in the gross domestic 
product is a Utopian dream. In the context of capital sentencing in Georgia 
in the 1970s, a good description of the “6%” racial disparity found by Baldus 
(after controlling for many other variables) is that it corresponds to an 
increase in the probability of a death sentence from 3% to 9%.54 Did the 
Eleventh Circuit really mean to say that an unexplained racial disparity that 
increases the risk of execution by a factor of three is just too small to require 
consideration? 
But why did the Eleventh Circuit choose this peculiar justification? Why 
not follow the district court and reject the study on methodological 
grounds? The common method for an appellate court to affirm a trial court 
decision that is based on an elaborate record is to endorse the factual 
findings of the trial judge. After all, trial courts are supposed to do the heavy 
lifting in evaluating facts, and their decisions are entitled to a great deal of 
deference.55 Why didn’t the Eleventh Circuit take that simple, easy route? 
The answer, I believe, is that the circuit court judges realized that the Baldus 
study could not be dismissed so easily. The McCleskey case was heading to the 
Supreme Court, and the Baldus study had already attracted a great deal of 
favorable attention. As a dissenting judge pointed out, it was already 
described in the record by a distinguished statistician and criminologist as 
“far and away the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing” ever 
conducted.56 The circuit court may have been unwilling to rest its judgment 
on the untenable claim that the most thorough study of sentencing patterns 
 
 51. Id. at 894 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 896. 
 53. Id. at 897. 
 54. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 47, at 147. 
 55. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other 
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
 56. See McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 907 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting the description of Dr. Robert Berk at trial). 
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ever conducted in this country was inadequate to satisfy its methodological 
demands. 
C. THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
McCleskey by a five-to-four vote, with Justice Powell writing for the majority.57 
After reviewing the history of the case, Powell quickly makes clear that he 
will not address any questions of fact: “As did the Court of Appeals, we 
assume the [Baldus] study is valid statistically without reviewing the factual 
findings of the District Court.”58 Instead, he rejects McCleskey’s claims 
because “[h]e offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support 
an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence.”59 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, this holding echoes the 1968 
decision on William Maxwell’s claim of racial discrimination in capital 
sentencing for rape—but only in part. The Eighth Circuit rejected Maxwell’s 
claim on two additional grounds, both empirical: Marvin Wolfgang’s study 
was also held to be inadequate because it included too few cases from the 
jurisdiction in question and too few nonracial control variables.60 In 
McCleskey, the Court backs away from any empirical criticism of the Baldus 
study. Instead it relies exclusively on the third basis for the Maxwell decision, 
the legal requirement that to prove discrimination in capital sentencing a 
defendant must produce specific evidence that the decision makers in his 
own individual case acted with a racially discriminatory purpose. 
One of the striking aspects of the succession of opinions in McCleskey is 
the progressive evaporation of the factual question with which the case 
began: Does the Baldus study prove race discrimination in capital 
sentencing in Georgia? The district court took on the study directly and held 
that it is so flawed that it proves nothing. The court of appeals retreated, but 
only halfway: it assumed that the study was valid but rejected it on the 
inexplicable empirical ground that the magnitude of discrimination shown 
was constitutionally insufficient. The Supreme Court eliminated all 
empirical issues entirely by deciding that this type of evidence cannot in 
principle establish a violation of the Constitution. 
Why this increasing empirical modesty as the case moved up the judicial 
ladder? Was it because at each higher step, as the record received more 
attention, it became increasingly clear that the Baldus study could not be 
 
 57. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 58. Id. at 291 n.7. 
 59. Id. at 292–93. 
 60. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 146–47 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 
(1970). 
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rejected on its own terms,61 and increasingly attractive to retreat to the safe 
turf of categorical legal rules? 
The meaning of the majority’s factual concession in McCleskey is driven 
home by one of the three dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, describes a concrete consequence 
of the system the majority upholds, as it is described in the Baldus study: 
 At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked 
his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid 
reply to this question would have been disturbing. First, counsel 
would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the crime or 
of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important than 
the fact that his victim was white. . . . In addition, frankness would 
compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that the race 
of McCleskey’s victim would determine whether he received a 
death sentence . . . . Finally, the assessment would not be complete 
without the information that cases involving black defendants and 
white victims are more likely to result in a death sentence than 
cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant and 
victim. The story could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey 
could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line: there was a 
significant chance that race would play a prominent role in 
determining if he lived or died.62 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent, for the four justices who also signed 
Brennan’s opinion, describes the distance travelled from Maxwell to 
McCleskey in detailed and personal terms: 
As a member of the United States Court of Appeals, I was 
confronted in 1968 with a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
State’s capital sentencing system based on allegations of racial 
discrimination supported by statistical evidence. Writing for a panel 
of the court [in Maxwell v. Bishop], I rejected that challenge for 
reasons similar to those espoused by the Court today. 
. . . . 
 The Court of Appeals found the evidence presented by Maxwell 
incomplete, not directly relevant to his individual claim, and 
statistically insufficient. McCleskey’s evidence, however, is of such a 
different level of sophistication and detail that it simply cannot be 
 
 61. A brief filed in the Supreme Court by several of the country’s preeminent 
criminologists described the Baldus study as “among the best empirical studies on criminal 
sentencing ever conducted.” Brief for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. 
Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel and Professor Franklin E. 
Zimring as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811). 
 62. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322–23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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rejected on those grounds. Unlike the evidence presented by 
Maxwell, which did not contain data from the jurisdiction in which 
he was tried and sentenced, McCleskey’s evidence includes data 
from the relevant jurisdiction. Whereas the analyses presented by 
Maxwell did not take into account a significant number of variables 
and were based on a universe of 55 cases, the analyses presented by 
McCleskey’s evidence take into account more than 400 variables 
and are based on data concerning all offenders arrested for 
homicide in Georgia from 1973 through 1978, a total of 2,484 
cases. Moreover, the sophistication of McCleskey’s evidence 
permits consideration of the existence of racial discrimination at 
various decision points in the process, not merely at the jury 
decision. It is this experience, in part, that convinces me of the 
significance of the Baldus study.63 
But the true significance of the McCleskey decision as a factual judgment 
is best conveyed by Justice Powell’s majority opinion, which speaks for the 
Court. A couple of incidental points at the end of the Court’s opinion are 
telling. They look like make-weight arguments, but they offer a window into 
Justice Powell’s thinking. McCleskey, he says, makes “wide-ranging 
arguments that basically challenge the validity of capital punishment in our 
multiracial society,” but the Court can only decide “whether in his case . . . 
the law of Georgia was properly applied.”64 Courts don’t deal with systemic 
claims like these for two reasons. First “there is no limiting principle to the 
type of challenge brought by McCleskey”—they could apply to sentences 
other than death and to discrimination by ethnicity or gender as well as by 
race.65 Second, “[l]egislatures . . . are better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate 
the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and 
with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.’”66 
In other words, Justice Powell seems to say, “It does look like there’s a 
real problem here. We don’t deny it. But we’re not equipped to help you. 
Ask elsewhere.” 
IV. THE AFTERMATH 
McCleskey remains one of the most controversial decisions in the history 
of the Supreme Court. It is often compared to other notorious cases in 
which the Court endorsed discrimination by race67: Dred Scott v. Sandford,68 
 
 63. Id. at 354 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. at 319 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 65. Id. at 318. 
 66. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
 67. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1388–89 (1988). 
 68. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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Plessy v. Ferguson,69 and Korematsu v. United States.70 Six days after it was 
decided, Anthony Lewis wrote in the New York Times that the Court had 
“effectively condoned the expression of racism in a profound aspect of our 
law.”71 Decades later, the criticism continues.72 
In 1990, the Congressional Black Caucus responded to McCleskey by 
introducing the Racial Justice Act, which provided that “no person shall be 
put to death under color of State or Federal law in the execution of a 
sentence that was imposed based on race,” and permitted courts to infer 
racial discrimination from statistical evidence.73 The Act was passed by the 
United States House of Representatives as part of crime legislation packages 
in 1990 and again in 1994, but it was deleted from the legislation each time 
in conference with the United States Senate.74 In 1998, a weak Racial Justice 
Act was signed into law in Kentucky.75 In 2009 North Carolina passed a 
much stronger Racial Justice Act,76 which is the basis for ongoing litigation 
on racial discrimination in capital sentencing in that state.77 
The most telling responses to McCleskey, however, have come from 
Justices of the Supreme Court. 
Justice Powell retired in June 1987, two months after he wrote the 
opinion of the Court in McCleskey. Three years later, his biographer asked 
him whether he would change his vote in any case. He replied: 
“Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.” 
“Do you mean you would now accept the argument from statistics?” 
“No, I would vote the other way in any capital case.” 
“In any capital case?” 
“Yes.” 
“Even in Furman v. Georgia?” 
 
 69. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 70. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 71. Anthony Lewis, Bowing to Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, at A31. 
 72. See, e.g., Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion To Change 
Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 730–33 (2003). 
 73. Don Edwards & John Conyers, Jr., The Racial Justice Act—A Simple Matter of Justice, 20 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 699, 700–01, 704 (1995). 
 74. See id. at 700–01. The main argument against the Racial Justice Act was that it would 
amount to an abolition of the death penalty. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The 
Racial Justice Act of 1994—Undermining Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial 
Justice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 655, 655 (1995). 
 75. 1998 Ky. Acts 941 (codified at Kentucky Racial Justice Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 532.300–09 (West 2006)). The Kentucky Racial Justice Act is prospective only—it applies 
only to defendants sentenced to death after July 15, 1998—and is limited to pre-trial claims of 
racial discrimination in capital charging. See Justin R. Arnold, Note, Race and the Death Penalty 
After McCleskey: A Case Study of Kentucky’s Racial Justice Act, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 93, 102–03 (2005). 
 76. 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213 (codified at North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011)). 
 77. See, e.g., Editorial, Race and Death Penalty Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at A22. 
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“Yes. I have come to think that capital punishment should be 
abolished.”78 
Three years after that, in February 1994—six months before he too 
retired—Justice Blackmun issued an opinion, dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari in the death penalty case of Callins v. Collins,79 in which he 
announced that he had concluded that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional: 
 From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the 
machinery of death. . . . Rather than continue to coddle the 
Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been 
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally 
and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death 
penalty experiment has failed.80 
One of the main reasons that Blackmun cites for this change of heart is 
the Baldus study: 
 A renowned example of racism infecting a capital-sentencing 
scheme is documented in McCleskey v. Kemp . . . . Warren 
McCleskey, an African-American, argued that the Georgia capital 
sentencing scheme was administered in a racially discriminatory 
manner, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In support of his claim, he proffered a highly reliable statistical 
study (the Baldus study) which indicated that, “after taking into 
account some 230 nonracial factors that might legitimately 
influence a sentencer, the jury more likely than not would have 
spared McCleskey’s life had his victim been black[,]” . . . . [and] 
that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death “at nearly 22 
times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the 
rate of whites who kill blacks.” 
. . . . 
. . . [A]s far as I know, there has been no serious effort to impeach 
the Baldus study. Nor, for that matter, have proponents of capital 
punishment provided any reason to believe that the findings of that 
study are unique to Georgia.81 
In April 2008, Justice Stevens announced in a concurring opinion in 
Baze v. Rees that he too had concluded that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional.82 One of the reasons Stevens cites for his change of heart is 
 
 78. JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994). 
 79. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). 
 80. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 1153–54 (citations omitted). 
 82. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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the “discriminatory application of the death penalty,” as shown by the record 
in McCleskey.83 Two years later, not long after his retirement in June 2010, 
Stevens told an interviewer that the only vote he regretted in his thirty-five 
years on the Court was his 1976 vote in Gregg v. Georgia.84 The votes of 
Justices Stevens, Powell, and Blackmun were essential to the seven-to-two 
decision in Gregg to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty. By the 
time they were persuaded otherwise it was too late to change that outcome. 
Other Justices have also cited the Baldus study, and the McCleskey case in 
general, to make the point that the administration of the death penalty is 
infected by racial discrimination.85 This is not surprising. Supreme Court 
Justices cite lots of sources. What’s more telling is that these claims are never 
disputed. Justice Scalia in particular is absent from this debate. On other 
issues, he frequently takes it upon himself to respond personally to other 
Justices who express concerns about capital punishment. He wrote separate 
concurring opinions in Callins v. Collins and in Baze v. Rees to rebut the 
opinions in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens, respectively, announced 
their conclusions that the death penalty is unconstitutional. But nowhere in 
those opinions, or elsewhere, does Justice Scalia say anything about racial 
discrimination. 
Justice Scalia is certainly not averse to judicial conflict, in this or other 
contexts. In the case of Kansas v. Marsh, for example, Justice Souter, joined 
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion in 
which five pages were devoted to their anxiety about the dangers of false 
convictions and the large number of recent exonerations of death row 
prisoners in the United States.86 Scalia responded with fourteen furious 
pages in which he belittles their concerns, ridicules the studies they discuss, 
and endorses the absurd claim that the American system of criminal 
adjudication is “99.973 percent” accurate.87 
Why then this uncharacteristic shyness when the issue is racial 
discrimination? 
After the death of Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1993, the Library of 
Congress made his papers public. They include a one paragraph memo by 




 83. Id. at 85. 
 84. Nina Totenberg, Justice Stevens: An Open Mind on a Changed Court, NPR (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130198344. 
 85. E.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 617 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 86. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207–11 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 182–99, 198 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Joshua Marquis, Op-Ed., The 
Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23). 
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Re: No. 84-6811—McCleskey v. Kemp 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I plan to join Lewis’s [Justice Lewis Powell’s] opinion in this case, 
with two reservations. I disagree with the argument that the 
inferences that can be drawn from the Baldus study are weakened 
by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large 
number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit 
in the opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it 
could only be shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, 
would require reversal. Since it is my view that unconscious 
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, 
upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, 
acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I 
cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to write 
separately to make these points, but not until I see the dissent.88 
In other words, Scalia was persuaded in the McCleskey case itself that 
Baldus had proved racial discrimination in the administration of the death 
penalty in Georgia. Since then he has apparently followed the polite precept 
that if you don’t have something nice to say about the death penalty, don’t 
say anything.89 
V. CONCLUSION 
I don’t want to sound Pollyannaish. McCleskey remains the law, and it is a 
terrible decision. Race discrimination in the administration of the death 
penalty continues. But however bad, that’s not the whole picture. 
In addition to reporting that he regretted his decision in McCleskey, 
Justice Powell told his biographer, “[m]y understanding of statistical 
analysis . . . ranges from limited to zero.”90 Powell was probably telling the 
truth about statistics. He may have had no clue what the Baldus study really 
meant on its own terms. But he had no difficulty understanding what was at 
stake in McCleskey. The question in McCleskey was indeed, as Powell phrased it 
years later, whether “capital punishment should be abolished.”91 
In Furman, the Court nullified all then-existing death penalty statutes. It 
wiped the slate clean. In Gregg, the Court gave states a chance to try to 
 
 88. Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The 
Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 528 (1995). 
 89. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 211 (1998) (concluding based on various 
sources inside the Court that Justice Scalia was persuaded by the Baldus study but was “willing to 
tolerate that bias and even thought that the other Justices, in candor, should admit that they 
were too”) 
 90. JEFFERIES, supra note 78, at 439. 
 91. See id.; supra text accompanying note 78. 
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administer their new, post-Furman death penalties fairly. By 1987, Georgia’s 
statute had been in effect for fourteen years. What would the Court have 
done if it had concluded that in practice the new post-Furman Georgia 
statute was permeated by unconstitutional discrimination? It could hardly 
have said: “Well, that didn’t work, so let’s start over again, and try, again, to 
create a fair system. We’ll check in ten or fifteen years from now and see if 
this time you get it right.” As Powell and his colleagues apparently 
recognized, if McCleskey had prevailed, the Supreme Court would probably 
have had to abolish capital punishment, in chunks if not in one blow. In 
1987, the homicide rate and public support for the death penalty were both 
very high, and had been for years.92 The Court was not about to do any such 
thing. 
The present Supreme Court is not about to abolish capital punishment 
either, but the surrounding climate has changed. Public support for the 
death penalty has decreased sharply over the past fifteen years.93 Five states 
have abolished capital punishment since 200794 and others may soon follow. 
In 2011, the number of new sentences was about a quarter of what it was 
fifteen years earlier,95 and the number of executions was half that in 2000.96 
The death penalty in the United States is on the decline. 
Concern about racial discrimination is not the driving force behind this 
loss of enthusiasm for executions. The main reasons appear to be a rapid 
decline in the crime rate, especially the homicide rate, beginning in the 
early 1990s, and rising anxiety about the danger of executing innocent 
defendants.97 In this new environment, however, the issue of racism in the 
use of the death penalty has gained power; in 2009, for example, it 
produced the Racial Justice Act in North Carolina.98 
The main reason that race is a powerful issue in debates about the 
death penalty is that everyone who cares knows that race plays a major role in 
determining who gets sentenced to death. And the single most important 
 
 92. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Hardening of the Attitudes: 
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994). 
 93. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 94. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited May 20, 2012) (noting that 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois have abolished the death penalty 
since 2007). 
 95. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2011: YEAR END REPORT 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2011__Year__End.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans’ Views 
on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003). 
 98. 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213 (codified at North Carolina Racial Justice Act, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011)). 
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reason that “everyone knows” this is what happened in McCleskey. Even on 
the Supreme Court that sent Warren McCleskey to his death, even among 
the Justices who most strongly support the death penalty, nobody has tried 
to deny that racial “sympathies and antipathies” decide who lives and who 
dies. No Justice said otherwise in McCleskey and none have denied it since. 
That may be the enduring legacy of McCleskey. 
But didn’t everybody know this all along? Weren’t the facts on the 
ground undeniable? I don’t think so. Facts are “undeniable” once we’re all 
convinced they’re true. If the Baldus study had not been so convincing, 
plenty of people would not “know” the truth about race and death 
sentencing—not all along, not now, not ever. Undeniable facts on the 
ground alone would not have produced a clean sweep of Justices of the 
Supreme Court. The Court is perfectly capable of looking facts in the eye 
and denying their existence.99 In this case, only a minority of the Justices 
directly acknowledged the truth of the Baldus study, but none of them has 
ever tried to deny it. It would have been a losing battle. 
No single accomplishment, however impressive, does justice to a person 
as remarkable as David Baldus. What Baldus achieved in McCleskey, however, 
is worth dwelling on, and not only because of its historic importance. David 
Baldus forced reluctant judges to face up to facts they would have preferred 
to ignore. He was simply too hard-working and open and thorough to be 
doubted. This came through in the record. It was reinforced by the 
evaluations of other renowned scholars. And it was solidified over time by 
the impressive body of work he continued to produce until his untimely 
death.100 
 
 99. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), for example, addressed a related 
issue. Armstrong presented evidence that all federal crack defendants in the federal district in 
which he was prosecuted were black, but that many—perhaps most—state crack defendants 
were white. The evidence was sketchy, but that was to be expected: he was merely asking for 
discovery, to get information from the government to attempt to prove a claim of racial 
discrimination in federal charging for trafficking in crack cocaine. The standard the defendant 
must meet to obtain discovery is supposed to be low; he only has to produce “some evidence” 
that similarly situated people of a different race are not being prosecuted. The district court 
found that he had met that standard, as he plainly had, and the circuit court affirmed. But 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for six members of the Court, concluded that somehow this 
showing was not even “some evidence” of selective prosecution. According to the Supreme 
Court, the disturbing facts Armstrong had assembled were worth nothing. 
 100. From the McCleskey decision until his death in June 2011, Baldus published many 
articles and reports on the administration of the death penalty, and conducted at least half a 
dozen major studies on the topic, some of which were as important and innovative as his better-
known studies in Georgia. E.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 
PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (1991); David C. Baldus et al., 
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002); David C. Baldus et 
al., Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 
(1998); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The 
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In a world in which “expert” is often synonymous with “partisan,” 
Baldus was known as a source of honest truth. Dave Baldus’s achievement in 
McCleskey is as much as anything a testament to his character—that of a 
tireless, selfless, passionate, inquisitive scientist. 
 
 
Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984–2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227 
(2011). 
